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Abstract 
Terrorism cannot be easily studied experimentally for obvious reasons. We report the results 
of a laboratory study (N = 149) testing the effect of cultural worldviews on feelings of threat 
and hostility toward Muslims in France that include in the design the deadly terrorist attack of 
January 7
th
 2015 in Paris as a naturally occurring independent variable. The results replicate 
past research by showing that in a natural context, people felt more threatened and more 
hostile toward Muslims after the terrorist attack than before. However, the reverse occurred in 
an experimental condition that made the French cultural worldview of colorblind equality 
salient: People felt less threatened and less hostile after the terrorist attack than before. These 
results provide, for the first time in the context of a real terrorist attack, support for Terror 
Management Theory’s proposal that cultural worldviews are an effective buffer against terror.  
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Résumé 
Il n’est pas aisé d’étudier les effets du terrorisme expérimentalement pour des raisons 
évidentes. Nous rapportons les résultats d’une étude de laboratoire (N = 149) testant les effets 
des normes culturelles sur les sentiments de menace et l’hostilité envers les Musulmans en 
France qui inclue, dans son plan expérimental, la présence des attentats mortels du 7 Janvier 
2015 en tant que variable indépendante naturelle. Les résultats de notre étude répliquent les 
résultats des recherches passées en montrant que les participants se sentaient plus menacés et 
ressentaient plus d’hostilité envers les Musulmans après les attentats qu’avant. Cependant, 
lorsque la norme culturelle de l’égalité citoyenne était rendue saillante, les participants se 
sentaient moins menacés et ressentaient moins d’hostilité envers les Musulmans après les 
attentats qu’avant.  Ces résultats fournissent, pour la première fois dans un contexte réel 
d’attaque terroriste, un soutien au postulat avancé par la Théorie de la Gestion de la Terreur 
selon lequel les normes culturelles peuvent servir de bouclier psychologique face à la terreur.  
 
Mots clés 
Terrorisme, menace, normes culturelles, colorblind, biais intergroupe, Théorie du 
management de la terreur, laboratoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This experiment is concerned with the psychological consequences of terrorism. On January 
7, 2015, France was in a state of shock. All the news channels were showing reports of 
dramatic events in Paris that resulted in several losses of lives. Two heavily armed gunmen, 
Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, introduced themselves in the office of a satirical newspaper called 
Charlie Hebdo and killed 12 people (see Khosrokhavar, 2015, Nugier & Guimond, 2016, this 
issue). Most of the victims were well-known French cartoonists and journalists. Shortly after 
the killings, the two gunmen could be heard saying that revenge for the prophet was a success. 
Indeed, Charlie Hebdo had published cartoons of Mohammed that were considered offensive 
by some members of the Muslim community (see Guimelli, Lo Monaco, & Deschamps, 2010; 
Kamiejski, De Oliveira, & Guimond, 2012a). These events were followed on January 9 by 
other killings and hostage taking in a Jewish store, adding to the drama. On January 11 2015, 
a total of 4 million people gathered all over France in a rally of national unity, making of this 
collective movement the largest in French history (Weil, 2015, see also Mayer & Tiberj, 
2016; Zehrouni, Rougier, & Müller, 2016, this issue). Past research has shown that in the 
USA, Spain, or the UK, people become more authoritarian, more anti-Muslims and more anti-
immigrants following a terrorist attack (see Etcheberria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006; 
Landau et al., 2004; Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams & Vasiljevic, 2016; see also Doosje, 
Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2010). The present research provides, for the first 
time to our knowledge, experimental evidence documenting conditions under which people 
become significantly less threatened and less hostile towards Muslims following a deadly 
terrorist attack. 
Coping with Terrorism: Terror Management Theory 
Our understanding of how people cope with threat has greatly benefited from the 
development of research inspired by Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986; Greenberg & Arndt, 2013). Because being human means being aware of our 
own mortality, TMT argues that we all have the need to manage the ever-present potential for 
intense anxiety or terror that comes with this awareness. One central hypothesis of TMT is 
that cultural worldviews defined as “shared conceptions of reality” (Greenberg & Arndt, 
2013, p. 402) are an important defense mechanism allowing people to cope with existential 
threats. In other words, it is through the construction of cultural worldviews that people can 
cope effectively with existential threats on the long run, and avoid being paralyzed by it.  
 Experimental research has provided much support for TMT (see Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015) using a large variety of experimental manipulations to activate 
people’s awareness of mortality (e.g., open-ended question about death, reminders of real 
terrorist attacks or tragic events, exposition to cemeteries or funeral home, subliminal death 
prime, etc.). All in all, the results of these studies converge in showing that strivings for self-
worth and bolstering of one’s worldview is observed when people are reminded of their death 
(see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg & Arndt, 2013). For example, in a series of 
studies, Landau et al. (2004) demonstrated that reminders of 9/11 terrorist attacks increased 
the appeal of a candidate with a charismatic and authoritarian style (i.e., one who displayed 
self-confidence, emphasized the greatness of the state and nation, and gave the illusion of 
providing security from threats such as terrorist attacks). The authors first showed that 
compared with people in a neutral condition, those who were asked to think about their own 
death (mortality salience) became more favorable toward G.W. Bush and his policy. Of 
course, issues of national security were an important component of Bush 2004’s presidential 
campaign. In additional studies, Landau et al. (2004) established the cognitive linkage 
between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and death-thought accessibility, suggesting that reminders 
of a terrorist attack can be seen as similar to mortality salience induction (see Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). Overall, the results supported the hypotheses that making 9/11 
salient was functionally equivalent to mortality in increasing support for President Bush. Thus 
terrorist attacks, as a form of mortality salience, may push people to seek for reassurance and 
rely on worldviews that may help them to fulfill their aim when the time comes.  
 After showing that mortality salience can increase authoritarian tendencies and 
intergroup hostility, TMT researchers began to study variables that might curb such effects 
(Motyl et al., 2011). Although there are still relatively few studies, findings suggest that 
reminding individuals of some core aspects of their worldviews can help them cope with the 
threat of death (see Greenberg et al, 1992; Gailliot et al. 2008; Jonas et al., 2008; Rothschild, 
Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). Motyl et al. (2011) reported that priming a perception of a 
common humanity attenuated an increase in anti-Arab prejudice and hostility toward 
immigration among Americans reminded of death. In a similar vein, Jonas et al. (2008, Study 
2) showed that in a context making salient the danger of terrorism and the threat of nuclear 
weapons, priming pacifism related thoughts among participants who were in a death salience 
condition (i.e., participants requested to complete a word-search puzzle with death-related 
words) increased their interest in peace promoting measures and their approval of peaceful 
conflict resolution. Thus, fear, hostility or conservatism, are not the inevitable consequences 
of terrorism or of mortality salience at large.  
Of course, being conducted in a laboratory setting, these studies do not provide any 
direct evidence that these findings are related to the behavior of people who are confronted 
with a real terrorist attack. The present research provides a unique test of this possibility 
by taking advantage of the fact that a major terrorist attack occurred almost at mid-point of 
a program of experimental research that was conducted to test the impact of various 
cultural worldviews. In the present research, we were especially interested in the buffering 
role of cultural worldviews. We suggest that if cultural worldviews are an effective 
defense mechanism, as argued in TMT, then when people are reminded of their 
worldview, this should help them cope with existential threats (i.e., Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attacks). A clear indication of such an effective coping strategy would be lower levels of 
feelings of threat, and lower levels of outgroup antagonism. 
Cultural Worldviews in France: Colorblind Equality vs. Laïcité
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 Studies conducted in several western countries provided evidence pointing to a 
significant role of cultural norms or worldviews
2
 in the explanation of anti-Muslim prejudice 
(see Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014). In support of an original theoretical 
framework, findings showed that national immigration and integration policies that were in 
place in various countries generated distinctive cultural norms of integration, representing 
distinctive shared beliefs or worldviews about the best way to deal with issues of cultural and 
religious diversity. Because of variations in the social and political context, a given 
worldview may be impactful in one country but not in another (see Guimond et al., 2013). 
Indeed, one can generally expect that a cultural worldview will be impactful in a country 
when it is representative of this country’s policy and traditions. For example, on the basis of 
Guimond et al.'s (2013) results, multiculturalism can be expected to have a more powerful 
impact in Canada or in the U.S.A. where it is a widely shared cultural worldview than in 
Germany or France where most people are perceived as being against multiculturalism (see 
Guimond, Streith, & Roebroeck, 2015). In the present experiment, four worldviews 
representing different approach to the management of diversity were experimentally induced: 
assimilation, multiculturalism, colorblind equality, and laïcité. These worldviews represent 
different policy orientations that are found in various countries around the world (see 
Guimond et al., 2014; Levin et al., 2012). However, the latter two were expected to be 
especially impactful in France.   
Historians and political philosophers have described at length the founding principles 
of the French Republic summarized by the motto ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ (see Amiraux 
& Simon, 2006; Bleich, 2001; Jennings, 2000; Laborde, 2001, 2010). These principles are 
centuries old. However, systematic attempts at understanding the psychology of French 
republicanism have begun only recently. There is now strong evidence suggesting that there 
are, not one, but two distinct dimensions that characterizes cultural worldviews in France 
(Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015). The first dimension, called colorblind equality, is a 
worldview that has a strong egalitarian component (Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015). It refers to 
the fact that France is made up first and foremost of “free and equal citizens”, not of groups or 
communities (see Guimond et al., 2014). It involves colorblindness in the sense that it implies 
that one should avoid categorizing people into an ethnic, racial, or religious group. This 
principle is often described as a central feature of French public policy (see Guimond et al., 
2014). 
The second dimension is related to the political principle of “laïcité” (see Akan, 2009). 
This principle is related to the French law of 1905 separating Churches and State (see 
Baubérot, 2012). However, important changes occurred over the last decade resulting in what 
Baubérot (2012) called a “new laïcité”. In contrast to historic laïcité that focused of freedom 
of conscience and had a strong egalitarian component, “new laïcité” is centrally defined by 
the belief that religion should be a private matter. This new meaning of laïcité can be seen as 
an outcome of the law voted in 2004 in France banning conspicuous religious signs among all 
pupils in public schools. One argument to justify this 2004 law was that it was needed to fight 
against Islamic fundamentalist movements (Idriss, 2005; see also Milot, 2013). 
Research revealed that new laïcité was significantly and positively related with anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice whereas support for colorblind equality was 
significantly and negatively related with anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice (see 
Guimond et al., 2014; Kamiejski, Guimond, De Oliveira, Er-Rafiy, & Brauer, 2012b; Nugier, 
Oppin, Cohu, Kamiejski, Roebroek, & Guimond, 2016; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2015). 
Moreover, the societal trend in France from 2010 to 2015 has been one where the theme of 
new laïcité has been on the rise such that participants in a control group in France can be 
considered as being in tune with the worldview of new laïcité perhaps more than colorblind 
equality (see Roebroeck, 2015). Thus, of the four worldview conditions, only colorblind 
equality was expected to reduce feelings of threat and intergroup hostility in France whereas 
new laïcité, in line with the baseline worldview of the control group, was expected to have the 
opposite effect. Finally, if cultural worldviews are involved in managing terror, as proposed in 
TMT, then the psychological effects of terrorism should be moderated by cultural 
worldviews. On the other hand, if the effect of the terrorist attack is the same regardless of 
experimental conditions, this would suggest that cultural worldviews do not have much to do 
with terror management.  
Method 
Sample 
Participants were 149 undergraduate students enrolled in the psychology program at a 
French University (84.6% women, Mage = 19.07, SD = 1.70). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the experimental conditions. The design of the study was a 5 × 2 factorial in 
which the cultural worldview of the organization (Control vs. New Laïcité vs. Colorblind 
Equality vs. Assimilation vs. Mutliculturalism) was manipulated, and the terrorist attack of 
January 7, 2015 against Charlie Hebdo was included as a naturally occurring independent 
variable by coding whether testing occurred Before vs. After the terrorist attack. Because 
participants were tested just before or in the immediate aftermath of the most dramatic 
terrorist attacks perpetrated in France at the time of the study
3
, we expected these terrorist 
attacks to have a major impact (medium-to-large effect sizes) on our dependent variables. 
Power analysis indicated a 66% chance of detecting a medium effect (Cohen’s d = .50) and a 
96% chance of detecting a large effect (Cohen’s d = .80) significant at the 5% level (two-
tailed). 
Procedure 
The procedure was modeled after the one used by Michinov et al. (2005). Participants 
were invited to take part in a study about leadership in organizations. Participants were first 
introduced to the organization and their role as a member of the organization having 
important responsibilities. The organization was characterized by either (a) a pleasant 
working environment (Control condition), (b) a shared striving for laïcité, banning the display 
of conspicuous religious signs at work (New Laïcité), (c) a shared striving for equal rights 
regardless of differences in origin or background between employees (Colorblind Equality), 
(d) a shared striving for unity and employees homogeneity (Assimilation), or (e) a shared 
striving for diversity and the acceptance of cultural differences among employees 
(Multiculturalism). Each of these cultural worldviews was presented as a mean to foster 
organizational performance. More specifically, all descriptions were identical to those of the 
control group with the exception of 5 keywords and short sentences added to define each of 
the four worldviews conditions. To reinforce this manipulation, the participants were also 
presented with 10 statements on the computer screen and asked to select three that best 
represented the culture of their organization. After having completed various organizational 
tasks, participants were asked to fill out a paper and pencil questionnaire that included the 
dependent measures of the present study.  
Measures 
Group threats. A six-item self-developed measure inspired from Stephan, Ybarra, 
and Bachman (1999), sought to measure the overall perception that immigrants are 
threatening. Among the six items, three measured the perception of a symbolic threat (i.e., 
“Immigration has a negative impact on the French culture.”,  = .63) and three others 
measured the perception of a realistic threat (i.e., “North Africans living in France benefit 
from social security at the expense of the French.”,  = .70). Participants were asked to 
indicate to what extent they agreed with each of the statements on a 5-point Likert-type scale, 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The internal consistency coefficient 
of the measure of overall threat was .79.  
Ingroup bias. To measure ingroup bias we asked participants to indicate their feeling 
towards 18 target groups on a scale from 0 (very negative feeling) to 10 (very positive 
feeling). Embedded within this list of groups were the two target groups of interest for the 
present study: French (ingroup) and Muslims (outgroup). To create the measure of ingroup 
bias, we subtracted the ratings of Muslims from the rating of French. A high score on this 
measure indicates a higher level of bias in favor of the ingroup, the French. Overall, 
participants displayed a significant ingroup bias by rating the ingroup (M = 8.4, SD = 1.58) 
significantly more favorably than the outgroup (M = 6.79, SD = 2.34, t(148) = 7.65, p = .001). 
Results 
The effects of worldview condition and terrorism (before vs. after the attack) were 
assessed using 5 × 2 ANOVAs (for the complete Table of means and standard deviations, see 
Table 1). These analyses yielded a significant worldview condition by terrorism interaction on 
overall threat, F(4,139) = 3.15, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .083, on symbolic threat, F(4,139) = 3.37, p = 
.01, ηp
2
 = .089, on ingroup bias, F(4,139) = 3.66, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .095, but not on realistic 
threat, F(4,139) = 1.95, p = .11 ηp
2
 = .05. None of the main effects were statistically reliable. 
As expected, these overall interaction effects derived from the effects of the cultural 
worldviews that are typical in France (see Table 1 for more details). Indeed, looking at the 
effects of the terrorist attack within the control, colorblind equality and new laïcité conditions, 
respectively we can see that within the control condition, the terrorist attack increased 
symbolic threat, t(139) = 1.70, p = .090 (marginal), and ingroup bias, t(139) = 2.23, p = .027. 
In contrast, within the colorblind equality condition, the terrorist attack actually decreased 
overall threat, t(139) = -2.38, p = .018, symbolic threat, t(139) = -2.10, p = .038, and ingroup 
bias, t(139) = -2.50, p = .014. There was no effect of the terrorist attack in the new laïcité 
condition on either of the measures, although the trends were similar to those observed in the 
control condition, ts(139) < 1.24, ps > .210. Indeed, combining the control and laïcité 
condition to increase sample size showed that the terrorist attack resulted in a reliable increase 
in overall threat t(139) = 1.89, p = .06 (marginal), symbolic threat, t(139) = 2.10, p = .028, 
and ingroup bias, t(139) = 2.43, p = .016.  
Table 1. Means (and standards deviation) for the DVs, as function of experimental conditions. 
 
  Before the attack After the attack 
t(139) Cohen’s d DV Worldviews n M SD n M SD 
Overall   
threat 
Control 6 2.45  .39 24 2.96 .61 1.51 1.00 
New Laïcité 13 2.62 .82 19 2.95 .86 1.15 .39 
Colorblind Equality 12 3.25 .62 18 2.57 .69 -2.38* 1.04 
Assimilation 12 2.95 .76 17 2.59 .81 -1.27 .46 
Multiculturalism 11 3.12 .78 17 2.57 .90 -1.95
†
 .65 
          
Symbolic 
threat 
Control 6 2.45 .34 24 3.07 .64 1.70
†
 1.21 
New Laïcité 13 2.69 .86 19 3.06 .80 1.24 .45 
Colorblind Equality 12 3.36 .69 18 2.72 .69 -2.10* .93 
Assimilation 12 3.11 .71 17 2.65 .81 -1.56 .60 
Multiculturalism 11 3.27 1.00 17 2.65 1.07 -2.03* .60 
          
Realistic 
threat 
Control 6 2.44 .69 24 2.86 .78 1.03 .57 
New Laïcité 13 2.56 .96 19 2.70 .89 .73 .15 
Colorblind Equality 12 3.14 .81 18 2.41 .87 -2.18* .87 
Assimilation 12 2.78 .94 17 2.52 .85 -.77 .29 
Multiculturalism 11 2.97 .69 17 2.46 .94 -1.49 .62 
          
Ingroup 
bias 
Control 6 -.83 1.33 24 1.71 2.14 2.24* 1.43 
New Laïcité 13 .07 1.97 19 1.70 3.06 1.10 .63 
Colorblind Equality 12 3.17 2.59 18 .82 2.35 -2.50* .95 
Assimilation 12 1.92 2.61 17 1.32 1.79 -.65 .27 
Multiculturalism 11 3.18 3.12 17 1.72 3.05 -1.53 .47 
Note. N = 149. † .05< p < .10; *p <.05; **p<.01;***p < .001. Cohen’s d are calculated with 
the following formulae d = (M1-M2)/√((s1
2 
+ s2
2
)/2)) (see Cohen, 1988). 
 
Discussion 
 This experimental study was designed to investigate the effects of cultural worldviews 
on perceptions of group threat and intergroup attitudes in France. Because some of the 
participants were tested before the deadly terrorist attack of Paris in January 2015, this 
naturally occurring independent variable was included in the design. We found that the 
psychological effects of the terrorist attack were moderated by the worldview condition. In 
their usual social worldview context, participants tend to become more threatened and more 
hostile toward Muslims as a result of the terrorist attack. This finding is consistent with 
previous research documenting similar effects of terrorism in other major cities (e.g., 
Etcheberria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006, see also Cohu et al. 2016, this issue). 
However, the major contribution of the present research is in showing that this type of 
reaction is not an inevitable consequence of terrorism. Indeed, when colorblind equality, a 
principle that is central to the French Republic, was salient, the terrorist attack resulted in 
lower feelings of threat and lower ingroup bias. This result suggests that the cultural 
worldview of colorblind equality was an effective defense mechanism allowing participants to 
stand up against terrorism. Such a reaction is consistent with the collective movement that 
occurred on January 11 2015 across all major cities in France (for evidence concerning the 
participation in this march, see Mayer & Tiberj, 2016, and Zerhouni, Rougier, & Muller 2016, 
in this issue). During this march, people displayed signs of “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” and 
“not afraid”, that are in line with our findings. People who used the French equalitarian 
cultural worldview were apparently able to resist against the trap of terrorism. They redefined 
the terrorist “threat” as a “challenge” and did not feel incapacitated by it (Scheepers, Saguy, 
Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2014).  
TMT suggests that people cope with mortality salience by investing in some forms of 
symbolic immortality. Thus, it predicts that in life-threatening conditions, cultural values and 
beliefs that are psychologically relevant and salient in the situation can be used in order to 
offset the debilitating effects of awareness of death. These values and beliefs can be more or 
less conservative and authoritarian. As a consequence, people can become more or less 
tolerant against others depending on what was activated in the situation. This is indeed 
exactly what we observed in our study. The cultural value of colorblind equality was found in 
previous research to be associated with greater tolerance in intergroup relations (see 
Kamiejski et al., 2012b). When these values were made salient in the present experiment, the 
terrorist attack led to greater tolerance. However, this type of effect was not observed when 
new laïcité was salient, and new laïcité was related, according to previous research, to less 
tolerance in intergroup relations. Thus, our results are consistent previous laboratory 
experiments (e.g., Gailliot et al. 2008; Jonas et al., 2008; Motyl et al., 2011; Rothschild et al. 
2009) that have used the priming of reminders of attacks (or of death reminders) and shown 
that priming cultural values can reverse the traditional negative aggression-enhancing effects 
of mortality salience. Nevertheless, all of these previous studies are laboratory experiments 
conducted in non-life threatening conditions. Whereas the variety of experimental 
manipulations that has been used lends convergent validity (Arndt & Vess, 2008), there is an 
almost complete shortage of knowledge about whether the effects of real terrorist attacks are 
similar or different from those observed in the laboratory. Thus, our results speak in a unique 
manner to the external validity of TMT. It is shown that the theoretical prediction about the 
buffering role of cultural worldviews is valid when including in the experimental design of a 
laboratory study the occurrence of a real and deadly terrorist attack. Indeed, it seems that the 
theory does explain the behavior of participants who are undergoing a real and significant 
threat following a major terrorist attack. Because the occurrence of this terrorist attack was 
totally unexpected, one important limitation of the present study is the sample size. In 
particular, we could not obviously insure that the number of participants tested before the 
attack was the same as the number of participants tested after the attack. Nevertheless, we 
took that into account in conducting our statistical analyses. Moreover, given the fact that, 
very few studies in social psychology have the occasion to examine the impact of real event 
such as terrorist attack on people’s reactions, we believe that these results are not trivial. 
Despite the small sample, the effects are significant and the effects size reported are 
acceptable according to the Cohen's criteria (1988). However, because small studies need to 
be interpreted carefully, we recognize the necessity to replicate these results in the future 
(Hackshaw, 2008).  
Our results go beyond the simple replication of TMT precepts in a real-world context. 
It also improves our understanding of the specific conditions under which mortality salience 
may allow people to act in one or another direction. More specifically, the other major 
contribution of the present research is in showing that not all cultural worldviews are equally 
impactful in a given setting. The rationale behind our propositions in this regard comes from 
an analysis of 15 years of research using the experimental paradigm developed by Wolsko, 
Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000, see Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013 for a review). Wolsko et al. 
(2000) were the first to suggest that one could study the effect of broad cultural ideologies on 
cognition and behaviors in the laboratory setting. In their paradigm, participants are randomly 
allocated to a condition stressing the value of multiculturalism or colorblindness in the 
management of intergroup relations. This experimental manipulation was shown to have an 
impact of stereotyping and racial prejudice in the USA, going beyond past correlational 
research to suggest definite causal relations. To understand the results obtained with this 
paradigm, Guimond et al. (2014) have argued for the need to consider not only the laboratory 
variables but also the wider social and political context of the experiment. It was suggested 
that what happens outside the laboratory in the society at large (i.e., the extent to which there 
is widespread support for multiculturalism or not) can have an impact on the behavior of 
participants inside the lab. Because a terrorist attack occurred in France during testing for the 
present experiment, the results provide compelling evidence in support of this argument. Not 
only, there are significant interaction effects between independent variables manipulated in 
the laboratory and events that occurred outside the laboratory, but also these interactions show 
that the impact of a worldview on terror management is culturally dependent (i.e., in France, 
there is a greater impact of French republicanism model compared with other cultural norms 
such as assimilation or multiculturalism). 
Because the need to understand the psychological resistance to terrorism is probably 
more important now than ever before, the findings of the present study strongly reinforce the 
importance of conducting theoretically sound research on the critical role of cultural 
worldviews.  
  
Note 
1 
Following Akan (2009) and Roebreock and Guimond (2015), we use the term laïcité rather 
than secularism, because the latter is often confused with the concept of “secularization” 
(Baubérot & Milot, 2011). In fact, these two concepts are clearly distinct (see also Cohu et al., 
2016, this issue. Laïcité refers to a political approach for managing diversity of religious 
fundamental beliefs, not to the general cultural process of secularization that result in a loss of 
the influence of religion over time.  
2 
In this article, we used interchangeably the concept of cultural worldviews with the concept 
of cultural norms to refer to systems of beliefs that are widely shared in a society (see Gelfand 
& Jackson, 2016). 
3 
The data was collected between the 26 November 2014 and the 6 February 2015. 
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